This paper studies how changes in the volatility of aggregate income affect the sovereign spread. I document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of European economies. Then, I propose a model with endogenous sovereign spread and time-varying volatility to understand this fact. I find that volatility changes affect savings and the sovereign spread. However, the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent, when the economy is relatively rich an increase in volatility generates precautionary savings. Instead, when the economy is relatively poor, an increase in volatility induces an increase in foreign debt and a higher spread. This mechanism is absent in standard business cycle models and only appears because of the default option. Moreover, this mechanism can generate a substantial variability of spreads only due to volatility shocks. In this way, the model is able to rationalize the positive correlation between sovereign spreads and volatility observed in the data. 
Introduction
This paper studies how changes in the volatility of aggregate income affect the savings decisions and sovereign bond spreads of small open economies where the sovereign interest rate reflects endogenous default incentives. This paper argues that the impact of an increase in the volatility of income appears even if the income level of the small open economy remains constant. Moreover, I show that volatility changes alone can generate a substantial variability of the sovereign spreads by an interaction of the precautionary savings motive and the default option.
To show this, I first document that there exist strong volatility changes in the GDP of four European economies exposed to the 2008 debt crisis: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. I estimate a stochastic volatility model for the GDP of these economies and compute smoothed estimates of volatility to show that this variable exhibits a strong positive correlation with sovereign spreads.
After showing that the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium small open economy model with commitment cannot capture this fact, I develop a model of endogenous default with timevarying volatility that allows me to rationalize this finding. After studying the policy functions implied by this model, I implement a type of variance decomposition exercise to quantitatively inquire which share of the variability of spreads can be generated by volatility shocks alone. By this exercise, I am able to show that income volatility matters for the dynamics of sovereign spreads.
During the last thirty years, the world experienced a variety of macroeconomic crisis affecting a broad set of economies, developed and emerging, with the common denominator of sharp increases in debt positions and sovereign risk premiums (and reductions in credit ratings).
1 These features raised the attention of policymakers and economists in academia towards the behavior of sovereign risk premiums and external borrowing conditions. 2 The 2008 European debt crisis has been signed by weak fiscal fundamentals, depressed economic performance, high and volatile sovereign risk premiums and high macroeconomic uncertainty. Due to the poor macroeconomic performance, the fiscal conditions worsen dramatically while the burden of debt and the sovereign risk premium increased. Additionally, the external financing condition deteriorates and imposes increasing limitations for business cycle smoothing. This scenario is often associated to high macroeconomic volatility. Even though the recent open economy literature studied the impact of sovereign spread shocks and sovereign spread volatility shocks on the macroeconomic performance of small open economies, to my best knowledge, there have been no attempts to study the way macroeconomic volatility, as a measure of macroeconomic risk, affects the sovereign risk premium itself, nor how it might affect the savings decisions under one side no-commitment.
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature, both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view. In the first place, I study sovereign spreads and GDP data of four European economies, namely Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. For each economy, I estimate an autoregressive stochastic volatility model for GDP and compute smoothed estimates for the time-varying volatility. I use these series to study empirical regularities and describe their degree of variability and persistence. I find that volatility experienced a strong variability and peaks after the 2008 debt crisis. More importantly, using these smoothed estimates I am able to uncover a negative correlation between spreads and GDP and a strong and significant positive correlation between the sovereign spread and the volatility of GDP.
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Then, the paper studies an economic mechanism by which changes in volatility affects the savings decision, the sovereign risk premium and default probabilities. To do so, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that produces an endogenous sovereign risk premium, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) . This endogenous spread is observed as a consequence of debt repudiation, i.e. the government cannot commit to repay its debt at any period.
Hence, default can occur in equilibrium and in this way, the sovereign risk premium works as a price of the default probability. I model the output process following a stochastic volatility model and I calibrate four versions of the model, one for each of the economies studied in the empirical section. I feed the estimates of the stochastic volatility processes into the general equilibrium model and calibrate the remaining parameters to match certain aspects of the default episodes.
I find that an increase in the volatility of output has asymmetric impact on endogenous variables depending on the income and level of debt. In a state of high income and high asset accumulation, that caeteris paribus is associated to a nil default probability, an increase in volatility triggers a precautionary savings behavior. That is, when the economy is "relatively rich", an increase in volatility tends to increase savings. On the other hand, increasing the volatility of output when the economy experiences a large default probability, that is when debt is high or income is low, can actually reduce savings. The intuition for these findings are as follows: when the economy is relatively rich, default probability is zero and the value of the default option is nil, hence, the economy behaves in a similar way to an economy without default option and the precautionary savings motive drives the dynamics after a volatility shock. Hence, an increase in volatility together with a third order positive derivative of the utility function imply that savings increase. Conversely, when the economy is relatively poor the default option becomes more attractive. In this case, an increase in volatility, that has a symmetric impact on the two tails of income probability distribution, works in a different way. The government realizes that high volatility increases the probability of a very high income realization and, if this happens, the economy would like to experience a high consumption increase in the future. On the other hand, an increase in volatility also increases the probability of a very low income realization, in which case the economy would be able to ameliorate the consumption drop by declaring default and not repaying its outstanding debt. Hence, depending on how large the increase in volatility is, and how large default incentives are, the government might actually increase debt today in order to take advantage of the probability of a large output in the following period, given that the limited liability implies that the economy will not face all the losses of a very bad income realization.
Risk neutral international investors, in turn, are willing to finance such a behavior as long as they break even in expectation.
The model is calibrated to match the default frequency, the share of periods in default and the average default duration for each economy. Additionally, I show that the simple model is able to account for the moments observed in the data even when they are not targets, specifically the model can replicate the fact that increases in volatility are associated to increases in the sovereign risk premium and that output is negatively correlated with sovereign risk premium. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first one to document the fact that increases in macroeconomic risk are associated to increases in the sovereign spreads. This paper provides some novel insights for the understanding of savings and consumption decision under uncertainty. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first one to study the impact of volatility shocks on savings when default can happen in equilibrium. Specifically, this paper is the first one in documenting the state dependent impact of volatility on the savings decision, an effect that is not observed in standard small open economy models with full commitment.
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Additionally, there are two main reasons that suggests it is important to understand the impact of volatility shocks on savings and the sovereign spreads, both from the asset pricing literature and also from a policymaker perspective. First, if the macroeconomic risk affects the sovereign spreads, the pricing of sovereign bonds in the absence of this factor might be significantly off and hence, arbitrage opportunities might arise during high volatility scenarios. Moreover, not taking into account macroeconomic volatility as a relevant factor might induce researchers to overestimate the importance of other factors, such as the output growth. On the other hand, from a policymaker perspective, not addressing the impact of volatility shocks in the sovereign risk premium might lead to the erroneous conclusion that stabilizing output is the only prudential policy to control the sovereign spread dynamics.
This paper is the first one to consider stochastic volatility process for income in default models and hence the first one to inquire about the impact of uncertainty changes in the dynamics of sovereign spread. Introducing exogenous volatility shocks allows me to isolate the impact of these shocks in a clean way that is standard in the macroeconomic literature and it is used to study quantitative implications of these shocks. Moreover, to my best knowledge, this paper is the first one to highlight the economic behavior behind the positive correlation between spreads and volatility, namely the fact that increases in volatility might induce an increase in debt because of the default option.
On the other hand, this paper does not provide a theory of volatility changes. This is in line with the majority of the papers in the literature on time varying volatility such as Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) , Bloom (2009) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) . Moreover, as discusses in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) , this assumption is in line with the tradition in macroeconomics that considers key variables as exogenous in order to study and "measure" their impact in business cycle dynamics, for instance terms of trade shocks in Mendoza (1995) or interest rate shocks in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) . The reason for assuming exogenous volatility shocks is to focus on the economic mechanism that transmits volatility shocks into spread variability. Moreover and importantly, there is no accepted theory of endogenous volatility changes and introducing it together with the current analysis will make the point of this paper less clean. Additionally, the theoretical model assumes that agents in the model know the stochastic process of volatility and observes its realization. This is also done to keep to objective of this paper as clean as possible, introducing a learning scheme about volatility shocks complicates the analysis although it is certainly an interesting extension for future research.
This paper is related to the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) on sovereign risk premium and default. In that paper, the authors model strategic default, that is a situation where agents take a default decision as part of an optimal plan. In the same line, Arellano (2008) discuss and apply a model in the same spirit to understand the macroeconomic behavior of Argentina during 2002 default and show that under asymmetric output losses, default occurs during bad times. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) studies the impact of permanent shocks and the default decisions. Lizarazo (2012) extends this framework to account for risk aversion of international lenders. Yue (2010) , on the other hand, studies the default decisions under debt renegotiation.
An optimal policy approach is taken by Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) who model the default decision for a government that has access to distortionary taxation. More recently, Mendoza and Yue (2012) study the default decision with endogenous output in order to reconcile the stylized facts of default episodes and the business cycle. This literature allows to model risk premium endogenously in fully rational perfect information environments. They do not, however, study the impact of volatility shocks in the sovereign risk premium.
This paper is also related to the literature on uncertainty and volatility shocks, such as Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Bloom (2009 ), Bloom et al. (2007 and Személy (2012) , among many others, that uses general and partial equilibrium models to study the effect of changes in the volatility of technology shocks in general equilibrium models for closed economies. These papers, however, do not study the role of volatility shocks in accounting for the variability of an endogenous sovereign risk premium. Additionally, my paper is closely related to Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and Gruss and Mertens (2009) that study the effect of changes in the volatility of risk premium shocks in macroeconomic dynamics. The authors, however, take the sovereign spread as exogenously determined and study the way changes in the volatility of risk premium shocks affect the macroeconomic performance of small open economies. In contrast, my paper studies the effect of changes in the volatility of the income process on the endogenous sovereign risk premium.
Hence, I consider this paper is a complement to theirs.
Even though there is an extensive literature that studies sovereign risk premium dynamics, there is no agreement on the factors driving this variable. One strand of the literature finds evidence suggesting that the sovereign risk premium is exogenously determined, or at least a large part of it does not depend on domestic conditions. In this line we can find Uribe and Yue (2006) and Longstaff et al. (2011) . On the other hand, Cline (2004) , Cantor and Packer (1996) , Eichengreen and Mody (2000) , among many other references, find that a large share of risk premium variability depends on domestic factors. In this paper, I follow the literature on default that models risk premium endogenously.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, presents and estimates a stochastic volatility model for the exogenous output process using Gibbs Sampling. Section 3 presents the model for the endogenous sovereign risk premium in the spirit of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) , but allowing the income process to follow a stochastic volatility model. Section 4, discusses the strategy to calibrate and parameterize the models for each economy. Section 5 discusses the main findings of the paper including policy functions and study of the dynamics conditional on no defaulting. Finally, section 6 concludes. An online appendix describes the data treatment and data sources, provides details on the estimation strategy and on the solution method.
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A model for output with stochastic volatility
This section studies some empirical regularities of the sovereign spreads and macroeconomic volatility. Hence, it is of first order importance to define a measure of aggregate macroeconomic volatility.
Here, I proxy the unobserved volatility series by the time-varying volatility of income. I estimate the unobserved volatility process by assuming an exogenous stochastic process for output with stochastic volatility, as implied by the following model,
Here, y t denotes the logarithm of linearly detrended and demeaned output; and σ t denotes the logarithm of standard deviation that evolves accordingly to equation (2). 6 I assumeσ is the 5 The appendix can be found in http://www.eco.uc3m.es/~hseoane/research.html. 6 As a robustness I also considered HP(1600) filtering and there are no sensible changes in the estimated processes of volatility. Moreover, I also compared the smoothed volatility estimates with the ones obtained by computing standard deviation using rolling windows of linearly detrended and HP(1600) filtered data and the qualitative behavior of the series are still highly correlated.
average of the logarithm of the standard deviation, η is a positive constant and |ρ σ | < 1. These three parameters determine the features of the stochastic process of the log-standard deviation of t .
The model for the stochastic process of output is given by equations (1) and (2). As can be seen, two shocks affect output, t and σ,t . These innovations, that follow Standard Normal distributions, affect the level of output and the volatility, respectively. Given this setup, an innovation to output of a certain magnitude,ˆ t , can have different impact conditional on the realization of the volatility shock, σ,t . In particular, a high σ,t will amplifyˆ t that will, contemporaneously, induce a larger impact on output.
The stochastic volatility model provides a convenient measure of time-varying volatility for macroeconomic models given that output data is usually collected at quarterly frequencies, alternative models such as "realized volatility" models are usually used with intra-day data. On the other hand, this stochastic volatility model is parsimonious in the sense it only depends on three parameters and is able to account for complex dynamics. Moreover, for the interest of this paper stochastic volatility model is a more convenient approach than that of the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) given that using stochastic volatility model we can isolate the impact of two different shocks, one to the level of output and one to the volatility of output whereas in the GARCH model we only have a shock to the level of output. The interpretation of the volatility shock is straightforward but not unique. Here, I interpret higher volatility as higher risk regarding the realization of the income shock. A detailed discussion about the stochastic volatility models can be found in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) .
The stochastic volatility model is highly non-linear and its estimation is challenging. This paper follows Kim et al. (1998) 
and Garcia Cicco et al. (2012) strategy and implements a Gibbs
Sampling procedure, together with a Bayesian approach. Table 1 presents the prior distributions used for estimation. I need to assume conjugate priors to use Gibbs Sampling to draw from known probability distributions. This is the reason for assuming Normal priors for ρ,σ and ρ σ ; and Inverse Gamma prior for η. To determine the prior hyper-parameters such as means and standard errors, this paper proceeds as follows: first, use data from 1970Q1 to 1979Q4 as a training sample and Note: For the Normal distribution "Hyper-parameter 1" stands for the mean while "Hyperparameter 2" stands for the standard error. For the Inverse Gamma distribution they are degrees of freedom and scale matrix, respectively.
use it to estimate an AR(1) process without stochastic volatility using ordinary least squares. I use the point estimates of this model to set the mean for ρ andσ and use their standard errors to determine the standard errors of the prior distribution (in particular, the standard errors of the priors distributions are 10 times the ones obtained by ordinary least squares). Then, using the residuals from the previous estimation, I compute a rolling window standard deviation and use its autocorrelation and standard error to determine the remaining hyper-parameters. I repeat this procedure for each country.
To estimate the stochastic volatility models, the Gibbs Sampling uses data from 1980Q1 to the Table 2 presents the posterior estimates and the 16th and 84th percentiles. As seen in the table, there is a strong autocorrelation in output levels and volatilities, but slightly less than output in all the cases. Additionally, note that Spain exhibits the larger standard deviation of the volatility, with η = 0.20. This means that, starting from the average volatility level, a shock of magnitude 1 to the volatility process will generate an increase of exp((−4.88) + 0.20) to the volatility of output, from the average volatility of output innovation, 0.0077, to 0.0094; or in other words, 20%.
Using the point estimates in Table 2 Figure 1 we see that these peaks are associated both to positive and negative deviations of output with respect to a linear trend. There seems to be, hence, no clear correlation between the series of output and the smoothed volatility. For instance, for the period 1980-1995, it seems that increases in volatility are associated to increases in output. On the other hand, it seems that after 1997, the correlation changed and increases in volatility seem to happen together with output drops, i.e. during the last 15 years, the correlation is remarkably negative.
A similar feature is observed for Greece, Portugal and Italy. Although the evidence is supported for shorter samples, the recent crisis episode shows a larger increase in volatility together with a dramatic output drop.
In summary, the figure shows that output exhibits substantial and persistent deviations from its linear trend while volatility shows also large variability. An important question is whether these changes in volatility are statistically significant. Figure 2 , plots the stochastic volatility jointly with the 60% confidence bands. As seen in the figure, although there is substantial uncertainty on the actual volatility level, changes in the volatility of output are significant for all economies and large changes are observed during the recent crisis. It is important to say that, even in this case, we cannot rule out that volatility has remained constant for several periods, such as the period between 1980-1990 or mid 1990s for Greece, Italy and Portugal. However, we can identify a substantial contraction in volatility during the 1990-2000 period, and a large increase in volatility starting in 2005.
For the objective of this paper, it is important to inquire how does the stochastic volatility of output correlate with the sovereign risk premium. Recall that in this framework the volatility of output is a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty and the main question of this paper is to study whether aggregate volatility can account for the variation of sovereign risk premium. Figure 3 plots the volatility of output and the sovereign risk premium for each of our four economies.
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As seen in Figure 3 , there seems to be an overall strong positive correlation between the volatility of output and the sovereign spread over the period 2001-2012 for all the countries. This correlation is generated by the rapid drop in uncertainty and spreads since the beginning of the monetary union and the increase in both measures after 2008. Table 3 presents related evidence, the point estimates and standard errors of the correlations between output and sovereign risk premium, and volatility and sovereign risk premium.
As seen in the table, output and sovereign spreads have been negatively correlated in these economies for the last 14 years. On the other hand, the volatility of output and the sovereign spreads are positively correlated. An important feature of these series is the persistence of both volatility and sovereign risk premium observed in these economies. As seen in the table these measures are highly persistent in all the cases, suggesting that changes in volatility and spreads are likely to exhibit a long lasting effect.
This evidence suggests that a model that accounts for the sovereign risk premium behavior should also account for these features of the data. We next present the model for endogenous 9 The measure of sovereign risk premium is the difference between the real interest rate on long term sovereign bonds and the real return of German long term bonds. Raw data on interest rates are "Long Term Interest Rates" from European Central Bank with maturities of 10 years, issued in Euros. In order to compute real interest rates, expected inflation has to be subtracted from nominal rates. Usually, expected inflation are computed by averaging previous periods inflation. Here, I assume expected inflation is the same across countries, which is a reasonable assumption given that all of these economies share the same monetary policy rule and the same Central Bank. However, as a robustness, I compute real rates by subtracting the average of previous 4 quarters of HCPI inflation from Eurostat and the findings of this section remain. sovereign spreads and use it to study the impact of volatility shocks in savings choice, sovereign risk premium and default probabilities. The model in the following section will be helpful to understand the dynamics behind the positive correlation between sovereign risk premium and volatility. In principle, note that if we read the data through the lenses of a standard RBC model with precautionary savings, as for instance the "debt elastic interest rate" model in SchmittGrohe and Uribe (2003) , an increase in volatility will induce a decrease in the leverage of the economy, or an increase in savings. If this is the case, the sovereign spread would decrease after a volatility shock given that it is positively related to the level of debt. Hence, a standard model with precautionary savings behavior might not be able to capture this fact and hence, might not Note: In this table, ρ(i, j) denotes the correlation between variable i and j, y t denotes output, σ t denotes the log volatility and spread denotes the sovereign risk premium. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All moments are in percentage terms. The measure of real sovereign spread is the difference between the real interest rate on long term sovereign bonds and the real return of German long term bonds. Raw data on interest rates are "Long Term Interest Rates" from European Central Bank with maturities of 10 years, issued in Euros. We assume expected inflation are the same across countries.
be appropriate to understand the sovereign spread dynamics.
Endogenous sovereign risk premium
This paper models the endogenous sovereign risk premium following the literature on strategic default as Arellano (2008), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) . This literature develops models for a small open economy that trades a homogeneous good with the rest of the world and has access to an incomplete international asset market with one side commitment.
The government of the small open economy cannot commit to honor its debt and, consequently, she is able repudiate it at any point in time. If the government defaults, it is assumed to lose access to international asset markets and experiences an output loss as long as it is in default. It is assumed, however, it can randomly return to international asset markets. It is also assumed that output is exogenously given, i.e. endowment economy, 10 and that there is only a shock to the output process. In this paper, I depart from this last assumption by allowing income to follow an autoregressive process with stochastic volatility as the one estimated in the previous section. Hence, as shown in section 2, the output process is affected by a shock to the level and a shock to the volatility. The remainder of this section specifies the model in detail, the recursive representation and defines the object of interest, the recursive equilibrium.
Model's Setup
The model economy is populated by a domestic private sector, households, the domestic government and the international financial investors. This section describes each agent in detail.
The domestic economy
Assume a small open economy populated by a large number of identical households that maximize the expected value of discounted utility given by,
Here, u (c t ) denotes the instantaneous utility function, that has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative. Intuitively, utility increases with consumption but at a decreasing rate.
β denotes the intertemporal discount factor, that can take values between 0 and 1, and c t denotes the consumption level of an homogeneous, perishable consumption good in period t. Households receive an exogenous stream of output that evolves accordingly to the process specified in Section 2,
consider capital accumulation, the set of states in simplified. The reader is invited to review Mendoza and Yue (2012) for a model with production, where output is produced using labor capital and imported inputs.
As described earlier, y t is the output level in period t, σ t is the logarithm of output innovation standard error, our measure of volatility or aggregate risk,σ is the average level of the log volatility and σ,t is the innovation to the volatility process.
Assume there is a benevolent government that maximizes households' utility. The government is the only domestic agent that has access to international lending and borrowing markets and can buy international bonds b . It is assumed that b > 0 means that the rest of the world is a debtor
to the small open economy whereas b < 0 means that the domestic economy has a liability with the rest of the world. Given that the government is benevolent and the households have concave utility functions, the government will use bond issuing to smooth consumption.
Assume the bonds are sold at discount at a price q(b , y, σ). The price of bonds is a function of the current realization of output, the current realization of volatility and the level of bonds chosen by the government in the current period. as often assumed in this literature, the government internalizes the effect of government debt on the price of debt. This means that the government knows that its behavior in the asset market will affect the equilibrium price at which the bonds are traded.
The key assumption is that the government cannot commit to repay the outstanding debt, that is, the government can default at any time. It is now convenient to switch to the notation commonly used in recursive macroeconomics. Hence, we drop the t sub-indexes and denote next period variables with a . If the government choose at any period to repay the outstanding debt, the resource constraint of the economy is given by,
Here, accordingly to the notation, c and b denote current consumption and assets, y denotes current output and σ denotes current volatility while b denotes the level of assets chosen at the current period that will be predetermined the following period. Note that international lending and borrowing is the only way the government helps households to smooth consumption. Any returns from the international asset market operations are transferred to households using lump sum transfers or taxes.
If the government defaults, the budget constraint reduces to,
Here, y def = h(y) ≤ y. With h(•) being increasing in y. We can think about this function as a penalty for defaulting that is increasing in the income realization. Another implication of the previous equation is that when the government defaults, the country is unable to access international asset markets and hence has to consume all its endowment given that it cannot be stored. We will refer to this situation as "autarky". As previous literature, I assume the country can return to asset markets with a probability θ any period.
The foreign investors
The rest of the world is populated by a large number of international investors that are risk neutral and have access to a risk free asset and also trade the risky asset with the domestic economy. The risk free asset pays the risk free interest rate. Given that foreign investors are risk neutral, they allocate resources across different assets as long as they break even in expectation.
Additionally, given the small open economy assumption any level of funds the domestic economy offers of demands will be traded at the appropriate equilibrium price.
Hence, foreign investors' problem is to maximize profits from operating in the international asset markets. Using Π to denote the investors profits, we can formalize their problem as follows,
Here R is the risk free rate and δ is the default probability. Taking first order conditions, the equilibrium requires q = 1−δ R . Note that given that (b, y, σ) are the states of the economy, and the timing is such that first the government chooses to default or not and then if no default is observed the government chooses how much debt take the current period, the price of debt has to satisfy,
That is, the price of debt is equal to the inverse of the risk free rate times the probability of repayment of the debt contract. Importantly notice that the small open economy assumption implies that the foreign investors do not internalize their impact on the default probability.
Recursive formulation
The model is solved using a variant of value function iteration. 11 For this reason, it is useful to write the recursive formulation of the problem. The states of the problem are the outstanding level of debt, as long as the government did not default the previous period; the output level; and the realization of the output's volatility; that is s = (b, y, σ). Using the previous notation, under no default, the value function for the government is given by,
Here, we replaced out consumption using the budget constraint under no default and v c (s) stands for the value function under commitment. Also, f (y, y ) denotes the transition function for output levels, g(σ, σ ) denotes the transition function for volatility levels, and v o s denotes the optimal continuation value, given by,
and v d (y, σ) denotes the value of default, given by,
Here, θ is the probability of returning to international asset markets after default. In this way, the recursive formulation indicates that, the government's objective is to maximize the value function of the economy given by v o b , y , σ using debt issuance, the default option and consumption.
In this framework, we can define a recursive competitive equilibrium as follows.
Definition Recursive Equilibrium.
A and default decisions, satisfy the government optimization problem.
2. Given y, σ, the price of debt q, the government policy function b (s) and default decisions, c(s) satisfies the resource constraint.
3. The bond price function q(b (s), y, σ) is consistent with a zero expected profits for international lenders.
To solve for the equilibrium and policy functions we proceed by value function iteration. A detailed description of the algorithm can be found in the Appendix. The next section describes the calibration and steps implemented towards the discretization of the endogenous and exogenous states.
Functional forms, calibration and discretization
This section contains some of the implementation details regarding the solution of the model and the discretization of the state space. The model is solved using a variant of value function iteration with multigrid, solving first the model for a grid of 50 asset points, then 100, 200 and finally 500.
I need to discretize the exogenous states, to do so I follow Tauchen (1986) . This model has two exogenous states, the output and the volatility of output. For the volatility of output I use a 21 nodes grid assuming the mean, autocorrelation and standard deviations in Table 2 and I set the grid to cover 3 standard deviations around the mean. To build the grid for the income process I have to take into account the stochastic volatility that now is represented by the volatility grid and has, hence, 21 possible realizations. Given this, I apply Tauchen's Method again. I specify a mean of zero and a correlation as the one in Table 2 . However, to specify the standard deviation of the innovation, I first specify the exponent of the first element of the volatility grid, that generates a grid for output conditional on the lowest volatility level, and then I construct another grid for output using the second element of the grid for volatility, and so on. For each grid I use 21 nodes and a I set the grid to cover 3 standard deviations around the mean. Ultimately the grid for income processes will be one of 21 times 21, each of them associated to a transition probability matrix, as well as one transition probability matrix for the volatility grid.
Functional forms
I assume the following functional forms: the instantaneous utility function is given by
where κ is the coefficient of risk aversion. Additionally, the output penalty function under default is
if y ≥ γȳ and y def = y if y < γȳ. Hereȳ denotes the average output.
Calibration
I calibrate four versions of the model, one for each of the countries studied in the empirical section.
I feed the estimated processes in section 2 for the income and volatility processes in the models and I calibrate the remaining parameters in order to match certain aspects of default episodes during the last two hundred years. The parameterizations for the income processes are shown in Table 2 in Section 2. I fix κ = 2, the relative risk aversion parameter, as commonly assumed in related studies. I set γ such that the overage output during default is in line with ones observed in the international macroeconomics literature. 12 For the remaining parameters, β and θ, I match default statistics in Table 4 , i.e. the default frequencies, the average duration of default episodes and the share of periods in default.
As can be seen in Table 4 , the economies have different default properties. Spain and Greece are the ones with a larger default frequency. Default frequency is computed as the number of defaults in terms of the numbers of quarters available in the data set. The average duration of default is the number of quarters the economy spent in default, on average across default episodes.
As seen in the table, Greece is the economy for which default is more persistent state compared to the other cases, for which default duration is between 20 and 30 quarters. Finally, the share of periods in default is computed as the number of periods the economy was in default in terms of the total number of quarters in sample. Table 5 presents the calibrated parameters.
As seen in the table, the lower discount factors are the ones of Greece and Spain. Discount factors have a direct effect on the average default probability. The lower the households care about the future the larger are default incentives and the more often default occurs. θ determines the duration of default, notice the smaller the θ the smaller is the probability of re-entering asset markets. γ also affects default incentives; I use this parameter to target share of periods in default.
The smaller γ the larger the share of periods in default. Finally, the risk free rate is calibrated to the average German rate. As seen in the table, using these calibrations, the models can match fairly well the targets shown above.
Results
We have shown that macroeconomic uncertainty and the sovereign spread are positively correlated.
It is not obvious the economic reasons behind this fact. To see why, consider the following case:
assume a standard small open economy business cycle model with commitment and a sovereign spread that is a positive function of the level of debt, such that if the level of debt increases the sovereign spread increases too. 13 If we assume that precautionary savings motive holds, which is implicit in a positive third order derivative of the utility function, an increase in the volatility of the economy would imply an increase in savings, which would translate in a drop in sovereign spreads. Hence, this standard model that is in line with conventional wisdom would generate counterfactual dynamics.
As we will see, the model with default is able to generate a positive correlation between spreads and volatility as observed in the data. In this section I study the policy functions to understand the economics behind this fact. We are particularly interested in the effect of volatility shocks on the savings decision and on the sovereign risk premium, or equivalently on the effect of macroeconomic volatility on the price of debt. To address these questions I start by studying the performance of the model in terms of non-targeted moments. Then I study the features of the policy functions, prices and interest rates to understand the source of economic dynamics. Then, I implement simulation exercises to study the way different shocks affect the dynamics of the model; in particular I inquire whether volatility shocks are quantitatively important to capture the variability of the sovereign risk premium.
Non-targeted moments
To compute the moments implied by the model I proceed by simulations, I run one thousand simulations of one million periods each. For each simulation, I identify the default episodes and discard the periods in which the economy was in default. Then, for each default episode, I
construct a sample of 125 quarters before default for the variables of interest. Table 6 presents a set of non-targeted moments implied by the model and their observed counterparts: the average spread, the volatility of spread and output averaged across default episodes and simulations and the correlations between spreads and income, and spreads and volatility.
As seen in the table, the model successfully replicates the variability of output, the negative correlation of income and sovereign spreads and the positive correlation between volatility and spreads even when these moments are not targeted by the empirical strategy. On the other hand, the model overestimates the variability of the sovereign risk premium and the average spread in most of the cases, except for Greece that experienced large and volatile sovereign spread. This is an expected feature of default models and the simulation strategy given that in simulations, I define the sample including 125 periods before default and, as seen in Arellano (2008) , the variability of spread increases substantially the periods before default.
In sum, the model is able to capture the positive correlation between spread and volatility observed in the data and the negative correlation between spreads and output and the overall behavior of sovereign spreads. Hence, we can use it to understand the economic intuition behind these facts and to study the quantitative importance of volatility shocks. 
Policy functions
This section studies the policy functions to understand the economic dynamics triggered by volatility shocks that were described in the previous sections. Given that the model economy has three predetermined variables, this section presents the policy functions as function of output and volatilities while keeping the asset positions fixed and then I show transversal cuts for high and low volatility scenarios. Figure 4 plots the policy function for savings in the space of income and volatility, assuming the debt level is fixed.
This figure shows the way volatility and income interacts to generate the saving decisions implied by the model. To study the impact of volatility changes alone we will study transversal cuts fixed at the ergodic income level. Notice that the policy functions have the a priori expected shape. All the countries exhibit a flat surface for low levels of income and its size increases in the volatility dimension. This flat surface is associated to default episodes as it indicates, conditional on a level of assets, the combinations of volatility and income levels for which the optimal decision is to default and move to a zero assets scenario. On the other hand, as seen in the figure, when the economy does not default, the larger the income realization and volatility, the larger the savings.
Only when income realizations are low, the economy defaults on its debt. This is in line with the findings in Arellano (2008) , the economy defaults in bad times.
When volatility increases, the behavior of the household is very different conditional on having a positive or a negative income realization. If high volatility occurs together with a positive income shock, the economy would be extremely rich. In this case, the optimal behavior of the government is to increase savings. The government does so in order to smooth consumption and spread present income realization in time. On the other hand, if the high volatility occurs together with a negative income shock, the economy does not have to decrease consumption to an extreme level given that it has the option to default and move to autarky. In this way, an increase in volatility has an asymmetric impact conditional on the economy being relatively rich or relatively poor. This is a feature of the limited liability setup generated by the one side no commitment assumption and its key to allow the model generate the facts observed in the data. When income is high, default is not a valuable option and the government operates as in the permanent income hypothesis scenario, in this picture we observe a combination of wealth effect and precautionary savings motive when the economy is rich and volatility increases. On the other hand, when the income level is low, the option of default becomes more attractive. In this scenario, the economy might find it profitable to increase the level of foreign debt because of the asymmetric costs. The main difference of this model with standard model of incomplete markets as Bewley models is that here, the gains associated to a high income realization are -net of debt repayment-fully consumed by the households, whereas the losses associated to a bad income realization are bounded for the households. In the worst case, the government is able to ameliorate the consumption adjustment by defaulting and moving to autarky. savings, high and low volatility look alike, in the cases of Greece and Spain, government saves more under high volatility, suggesting a strong precautionary savings motive whereas in the cases of Italy and Portugal they seem to be much closer suggesting the precautionary savings motive is weaker although it ca be seen clearly for low levels of debt. Hence, when the economy is relatively rich, i.e. it has assets or low levels of debt, increases in volatility tend to induce an increase in savings.
On the other hand, when the level of debt is relatively larger, as seen in most of the cases, it is possible that the economy will save less under high volatility than under low volatility scenarios.
This occurs because of the volatility increase and the limited liability induced by default. When the economy is relatively poor, an increase in volatility induces a risk taking behavior that, in this case, assimilates to an increase in debt, making the economy more vulnerable to a negative income shock. The reason why this behavior is optimal is because if the bad scenario occurs, the government is able to exercise the default option whereas if the good scenario occurs, the economy will be able to repay its debt and even save using international asset markets.
Additionally, in most of the cases, the default region is smaller for the high volatility scenario than for the low volatility scenarios. The economic intuition for this goes as follows, if the economy experiences today a high volatility scenarios, it is likely that this high volatility is present in the future, given that volatility is persistent. Hence, given the option of default tomorrow that bounds the potential losses of a bad income realization, the government cares about the potential gains of a good realization. If the good income shock occurs in the future, the government would like to have access to financial markets in order to save part of the income. This implies that the incentives to default, everything else equal, might be smaller for high volatility economies. Figure 6 presents the price bond schedule q(b , y, σ) and the sovereign interest rate, i.e. the inverse of the equilibrium price. The price bond schedule reflects the default incentives. As seen in the case of savings, here the price bond schedule for high and low volatility also cross, which means that the probability of default can increase or decrease with volatility changes, depending on the states of the economy, i.e. depending on the level of debt. This variable captures the impact of volatility conditional on the economy's desired level of debt for the next period. Hence, it does not include the response in terms of savings, only the default incentives reflected in the contract. An increase in volatility increases the tails of the income distribution, hence, it increases the probability of good scenarios and the bad scenarios. If the economy is in a region of high default probability, low q(b , y, σ), an increase in volatility can increase q(b , y, σ), meaning that it lowers default probability. The reason is that for any level of b , the economy might default with lower probability because if the good scenario occurs, the government want to have access to international asset markets to be able to smooth consumption. For the region in which default probability is low an increase in volatility lowers the price bond schedule. Here an increase in volatility just make your income profile more uncertain, conditional on government's choice of b .
The dynamics of the equilibrium price of debt, the inverse of the interest rate, is a combination of the price and savings dynamics.
Note that, as discussed in this section, increases in volatility can have two opposite effects on savings and on the price of debt. If the economy is relatively rich and default probability is small, an increase in volatility is likely to increase asset accumulation, in line with standard precautionary savings motive. This increase in savings (or de-leveraging) contributes to keep a high price of debt and a zero default probability. On the other hand, if the economy is relatively poor, an increase in volatility can induce an increase in debt accumulation contributing to a higher default probability and to a lower price of debt. Finally, if default probability is close to one, an increase in volatility decreases the price bond schedule because the government would like to have access to asset markets if the good scenario occurs. Hence, for the case of this model, generating a positive correlation between the volatility and the sovereign spread is a quantitative question.
In the following section I study variance decomposition and simulation exercises and discuss the quantitative features of the model.
Dynamics
The objective of this section is to study whether volatility shocks can have a quantitatively important effect on the dynamics of the sovereign risk premium. Table 7 compares the default features of the models when different type of shocks can hit the economy. In a way, this is a variance decomposition exercise. Given that I solve the model using a non-linear solution method, the interpretation of a variance decomposition exercise is more complicated than the one for linear, or linearly approximated models. In the linear case, the variance of the endogenous variables implies that the variability of endogenous variables computed using one shock at a time will add up to the total variability generated by the model. This is not the case for non-linear models as the shocks might have non-linear interactions. For this reason, the variability under "Level Shocks"
and "Volatility Shocks" might not add up to the volatility of the "Full Model" or might even exceed it. Table 7 presents the default properties of the model implied by simulating the full model, the model with only level shocks, for which I fix the volatility level in the mean value, and only volatility shocks, fixing the income level at its mean level.
As seen in the table, the default frequency decreases if we remove volatility shocks. For instance, default frequency for Spain goes from 0.71% to 0.36% without volatility shocks and similar findings are observed for the rest of the countries. Accordingly, the share of periods in default also falls. In all the cases, the interaction between level and volatility shocks induce an increase in frequency of default. Notice that this suggests that the mechanism described in the previous section is quantitatively important, volatility shocks increase the probability of default. Note: The column "Full Model" compute default statistics for the model with level and volatility shocks. The column "Level Shocks" reports moments for the model that only simulates level shocks keeping volatility fixed in its average value. The column "Volatility Shocks" reports moments for the model that only simulates volatility shocks keeping output fixed to its average value. The number of Monte-Carlo simulations is 1000.
As seen in the table, volatility shocks have a major impact on the first and second moments.
However, this impact is different conditional on the calibrations. First, note that eliminating volatility shocks reduces the standard deviation of income in all the cases. The impact on the average spread and on the volatility of spread is heterogeneous. As can be seen, only income shocks tend to increase the average spread in all the cases, but then tend to fluctuate less. Note, on the other hand, that only volatility shocks can generate substantial variation in the spreads, in particular for high default probability economies. Additionally, the correlations of the spread with output are hardwired in the dynamics of the model, i.e. in the fact that the economies represented by this model defaults in bad times, and they do not seem to be affected by the volatility shocks.
On the other hand, the variability of the spread and volatilities is ameliorated by the level shocks, but the mechanism described in the previous section drives the sign of this correlation even in the absence of level shocks.
Conclusion
This paper studies how changes in the volatility of aggregate income affect savings, sovereign spreads and default probability in small open economies with one side no-commitment. The main question this paper answers is whether volatility shocks can contribute in a sizable manner to the variability of the sovereign spread or, on the other hand, the sovereign spread variability is a consequence of only shocks to output level. This question complements recent studies that try to analyze the impact of changes in spreads in highly volatile environments.
To do this, I start by studying sovereign spreads and GDP data of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, with a special interest in the 2008 debt crisis. For each economy, I use quarterly GDP data since 1970 to 2011 and a Gibbs Sampling strategy to estimate an autoregressive stochastic volatility model for GDP and I compute the smoothed estimates for the time-varying volatility of each economy. I use these series to study empirical regularities and I find that volatility experienced a strong variability and peaks after the 2008 debt crisis. Additionally and more importantly, using these smoothed estimates I am able to uncover a negative correlation between spreads and GDP and a strong and significant positive correlation between the sovereign spread and the volatility of GDP.
After establishing these facts, the paper studies the economic mechanism by which changes in volatility affects savings or issuing foreign debt decision, the sovereign risk premium and default probabilities. I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that produces an endogenous sovereign spread and I model the output process following a stochastic volatility model. I calibrate four versions of the model, I feed the estimates of the stochastic volatility processes into the general equilibrium model and calibrate the remaining parameters to match the default frequency, the share of periods in default and the average default duration for each economy. It is shown that this model is able to account for several non-targeted moments and stylized facts observed in the data, in particular the positive correlation between spreads and volatility.
14 The paper shows that an increase in the volatility of output has asymmetric impact on endogenous variables depending on the income and level of debt. In a state of high income and high asset accumulation, an increase in volatility induces precautionary savings. Conversely, an increase in the volatility of output when debt is high or income is low, can actually have a negative effect on savings. The rationality behind these findings are as follows: when the economy is relatively rich and default probability is zero, the economy behaves in a similar way to an economy without default option and the precautionary savings motive induces an increase in savings after a volatility shock. On the other hand, when the economy is relatively poor and default probability is large, the government realizes that high volatility increases the probability of high income realizations and, if this happens, the economy would like to experience a high consumption increase in the future; however, an increase in volatility also increases the probability of a low income realization, in which case the economy would be able to ameliorate the consumption drop by defaulting.
Hence, depending on the size of the increase in volatility, and how large default incentives are, the government might actually increase debt today in order to take advantage of the probability of a high output realization in the future, given that the limited liability implies that the economy will not face all the losses of a very bad income realization.
Then, I implement a variance decomposition exercise and I find that volatility shocks alone, in the absence of any shock to the level of income, can generate substantial share of the sovereign spreads variability. In the cases of Greece and Spain it can account for up to 77% and 56% of the variability of spreads, respectively. This finding suggests that the theoretical implications of the model can be quantitatively relevant.
An important contribution of this paper is that it provides some novel insights for the understanding of savings and consumption decision under uncertainty. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first one to study the quantitative implications of volatility changes on savings choice in a model with endogenous default decision. Specifically, this paper is the first one in documenting the state dependent impact of volatility on the savings decision, an effect that, importantly, is not observed in standard RBC models for small open economies.
These findings suggest that sovereign risk premium variability is not only due to actual income shocks, but also to the fact that the economy becomes riskier. This finding has not been taken into account by the existing literature. In particular, existing literature studying risk shocks assumes sovereign spreads are exogenous or are ad-hoc function of the level of some endogenous variables. This finding is key, in particular for policymakers and asset pricing. For the former ones, it suggests that stabilizing output alone will not necessarily lead to a stable sovereign risk premium, reducing the risk associated to income shocks also matters. Additionally, in terms of asset pricing, this paper implies that considering the impact of risk shocks is key to correctly price sovereign bonds. If this factor is not included, the pricing might end up concluding that changes in the level of output and debt to output ratios are responsible for changes in prices that might have been induced only by changes in risk.
In sum, an increase in the volatility of income can induce an increase in default probability and subsequently, it might lead to a lower price of debt and a higher sovereign spread. The mechanism described in this paper rationalizes the positive correlation between sovereign spreads and volatility observed in the data.
